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MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR THE BREACH OF
THE COVENANTS OF QUIET ENJOY-
MENT AND WARRANTY
SYDNEY E. SHUTERAN*
HE current activity in real estate gives impetus to theTimportance of the remedy afforded a covenantee for the
breach of the covenants of quiet enjoyment and war-
ranty. While the subject has received only casual attention
from the law courts, being infrequently litigated, it is likely,
however, that the lawyer, because of this increased activity,
will be called upon more often to answer the questions arising
from the breach of these covenants.
Briefly, a covenant of quiet enjoyment may be defined
as an agreement that the grantee will not be evicted by a title
paramount or by any act of the grantor, while the covenant
of warranty is one whereby the grantor agrees to execute any
instrument necessary for the interest of the grantee, and to
defend the premises. Both covenants, then, are assurances to
the purchaser and his assigns against loss of title and posses-
sion. They are usually treated as synonymous since the con-
currence of the same circumstances is necessary to constitute a
breach.' The covenants relate to the possession of the subject
matter of a conveyance rather than to the state of the title.
The modern covenant of warranty is the outgrowth of the
old common law warranty and is now merely a personal cov-
enant, a breach of which entitles the covenantee to the recov-
ery of damages. The early common law did not recognize
personal covenants; however, the feoffment was usually at-
tended with a warranty which was a common law form of
covenant of title. The remedy upon the warranty developed
*LL.B.. Westminster Law School.
16 Sutherland, Damages, (4th Ed.) ; Hayden v. Patterson, 39 Colo. 15, 88 Pac.
437 (1906).
2In ssisses, the tenant could bring a writ of warrantia chaetae against the war-
rantor to compel him to assist with a good plea or defense, or else render damages.
If there was a recovery against the tenant the judgment simultaneously was good
against the warrantor to recover other lands of equal value. 3 Blackstone 300. Until
the statutes of Merton, Marlbridge, and Gloucester (52 Henll, c. 16. A. D. 1267)
damages were not recoverable for real actions. (See reading of Coke on these statutes,
2 Institute.) The warranty which usually attended with a feoffment was in its
nature a covenant real. that is, compensation for its breach was awarded, not in dam-
ages, but in kind. The judgment was against the warrantor for the recovery of other
lands of equal value to those of which the warrantee had been deprived. The deter-
mination of the value, however, was always that of the land at the time the warranty
was made and not the enhanced value at the time of the eviction.
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into what is known as a mixed action wherein the warrantee
recovered land in so far as the warrantor could render other
land of equal value, and damages to make up the deficiency.
This stringent rule was soon to find disfavor, and the war-
ranty became recognized as a personal covenant for the breach
of which an action for damages may be maintained as often as
there is an eviction from any part of the land warranted.
The question of when the cause of action arises is aided
in Colorado by statutory enactment which provides that nc
right of action on the covenant may be had after possession is
given until the party menacing possession shall have com-
menced legal proceedings and the grantor after notice shall
have refused or failed to defend." The covenant is not broken
by a tortious disturbance nor by an eviction by a stranger
because it is beyond the control of the grantor and the grantee
may have his remedy against the wrongdoer. Cases hold that
a paramount title amounts to an eviction, but in Colorado
under the statute referred to an eviction alone is insufficient.
The covenantee cannot surrender possession to the holder of
the paraount title before suit is brought.'
In Tierney v. Whiting,5 the plaintiff sued for breach of
the covenant claiming eviction by paramount title. The de-
fendant pleaded that the plaintiff was never lawfully evicted.
The plaintiff had derived title by the sale of the administrator
of the estate of the owner. The defendant, as the owner's
widow, had possession. The court held that the statute re-
quiring the commencement of legal proceedings as a condition
'Colo. Comp. Laws (1921), Sec. 4887. Damages for which the warrantor is
liable may be diminished by any profit which the warrantee has recovered from the
person bringing the eviction action. A restoration after eviction does not defeat the
right to bring the action but may go in mitigation of the damages.
It is an ancient maxim of law that no title is completely good unless the right of
possession be joined with the right to the property, which right is denominated a
double right and when to this double right the actual possession is also united then
there is, and then only, a complete legal title. 2 Blackstone 191. When none of the
parties have been in actual possession the covenant is broken at a time not later than
when the grantee is obliged to buy an outstanding title decreed to be in another. Hay-
den v. Patterson, 39 Colo. 15, 88 Pac. 47 (1906).
Ernst v. St. Clair. 71 Colo. 353, 206 Pac. 799 (1922). held that notice to
the warrantor was a condition precedent to the bringing of the action by the war-
rantee. See also Hurd v. Smith, 5 Colo. 233 (1880).
'Seyfried v. Knoblauch, 44 Colo. 86, 96 Pac. 993 (1908); 2 Colo. 620
(1875).
'2 Colo. 620 (1875).
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precedent, did not apply when the grantee has not obtained
possession nor when the holder of the adverse title has posses-
sion prior to and since the deed was executed. The para-
mount title must be shown to exist before or at the time the
defendant made his covenant and the burden of proof is upon
the plaintiff to show the party by whom he was evicted had
the better title."
Before discussing the damage action as a recourse for the
breach, it is well to consider other rights of which the grantee
may avail himself. Colorado, like many of the other states,
has put upon its statute books an act for the registration of
land titles. By the operation of this law a grantee may regis-
ter-his title by making application to the district court of the
county wherein the land is situated, the effect of which is to
quiet title in the grantee.7 The covenantee may then avail
himself of this safeguard. An action to quiet title after a
breach, while adequate, would, under some circumstances,
defeat the right to complete compensation to which the cove-
nantee is entitled. This is so because the action is limited to
the determination of title and not to the recovery of damages.
When there has been a breach of the covenant the main in-
quiry is, of course, what is an adequate compensation to the
party injured? Hence, it is of greater importance to ascertain
the germane rules by which the amount of damages is to be
determined.
Perhaps the earliest case on the subject in this country
set forth what is known as the New York Rule, established
in the early case of Staats v. Ten Eyck.' The defendant's
testator had owned certain lots which came by mesne convey-
ances to C, the grantee of the plaintiff. C, being evicted, re-
covered against the plaintiff, who then sued the defendant on
'When the covenantee has extinguished the paramount title he will be limited to
the amount paid by him for that purpose including incidental expense and a reason-
able compensation for his trouble, but in no event will it exceed in all the limit of
damages for a total breach. See also Stone v. Rozisk, 88 Colo. 399, 297 Pac. 999
(1931).
'Colo. Comp. Laws (1921), Sec. 4924-5025.
'3 Cainess 111 (N. Y.), 2 Am. Dec. 254.
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the covenants of seisin and quiet enjoyment.' The principal
question determined in the case was whether the measure of
damages was the value of the property at the time of the evic-
tion, or at the time of the conveyance. The court applied the
common law rule that the recovery would be measured by the
value of the land at the time the warranty was made. The
general rule for the measure of damages when there is a total
breach of the covenant includes the value of the premises at
the time of the conveyance determined by the consideration
paid; interest to the time of the trial; mesne profits; and costs
and expenses incurred in defense of the title. 10
While most jurisdictions, including Colorado, have
adopted this general rule the covenant is regarded in some New
England states as intended to indemnify the covenantee for
any loss suffered by him, and as consequently to entitle him
to damages to the extent of the value of the land at the time
of the eviction." The adopted rule very definitely does not
allow recovery for an enhanced value of the land.
Upon this point there is opportunity for a change in the
law. Inasmuch as the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale applies
so that the compensation must equal the injury, there are cir-
cumstances under which the enhanced value may be a proper
inquiry. When the enhanced value is by reason of natural
development, there should be no quarrel with the present rule.
When the covenantee in good faith at his own expense makes
improvements which he cannot remove, it is contrary to the
fundamental concept of the law of damages to refuse recov-
ery for the improvements. An analagous situation where a
'In Colorado the covenant runs with the land and inures to the benefit of all
subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers. Com. Laws (1921), Sec. 4886. The
covenantee cannot release the covenant to an assignee and the assignee still has the
right of action against th original covenantor. The measure of damages for breach of
the covenant in a suit brought by a remote grantee is the consideration paid by the
warrantee to his immediate grantor with interest but not to exceed the amount of con-
sideration given for the original conveyance by the original grantee. Although the
original grantee may sue all the previous covenantors simultaneously he is entitled to
but one satisfaction. A several judgment may be recovered but each is limited to the
consideration received by each grantor from the subsequent grantee. This rule gives
compensation for loss and that is all any evicted grantee can reasonably expect. Taylor
v. Wallace, 20 Colo. 211, 37 Pac. 963 (1894).
"Tibbets v. Terril, 44 Colo. 86, 96 Pac. 993 (1908) ; Jones v. Hayden, 3 C. A.
303 (1893) ; for collection of cases see 4 Sutherland, Damages (2nd Ed.), pp. 2097-
2098; Staats v. Ten Eyck (N. Y.), 3 Cainess 111.
"Gore v. Braxier, 3 Mass. 523, 3 Am. Dec. 182.
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person claiming under a tax title makes improvements on the
land, Colorado has consistently held that recovery could be
had for improvements made in good faith. 2
Two of the more important specific elements of damage
are attorney's fees and interest. The general rule with refer-
ence to the former is that unless the contract provides therefor
or contemplates them they are not recoverable, but if the
plaintiff in good faith prosecutes or defends a previous action,
then attorney's fees will be granted.1" In allowing interest
the modern trend is for the courts to recognize that no good
reason exists for drawing an arbitrary distinction between
liquidated and unliquidated damages. Interest, therefore, is
a proper element of damages to be made in view of the de-
mands of justice rather than through the application of an
arbitrary rule of law. Interest is generally computed to the
time of the trial upon the amount of the consideration paid."
The law involved in this discussion is of a peculiarly
technical nature; however, the authorities cited are offered to
the general practitioner as an indices to the governing author-
ities upon the general title.
"Knowles v. Martin, 20 Colo. 393, 38 Pac. 467 (1894): Central Realty Co.
v. Frost, 76 Colo. 413, 232 Pac. 111 (1924).
121 A. L. R. 332.
"Sedgwick on Damages (8th Ed.), Par. 299, 300, 312, 315.
DID YOU KNOW THAT-
A Tennessee law makes it necessary for the driver of an automobile
to give ten days' notice that he is going to drive on any road-by tacking
notices alongside said road?
It is illegal to carry a cane in Texas?
The town of Glen Cove, N. Y., imposes a fine of $10 on any person
caught digging more than 24 sand worms at one time?
A statute in Kansas requires that every able-bodied citizen between
the ages of 21 and 60 shall kill grasshoppers one day each year?
A law of the town of Nottingham, Me., provides that hogs must be
allowed to roam loose between March 1 and October 20?
A North Carolina law makes it illegal to sing out of tune?
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